Torte De Lini

Instead of Valve’s The International tournament in August, a league collaboration between teams, Epic Esports Events & WePlay! has begun. This league comes at a dire time where the final Majors of last year’s DPC system have been canceled due to COVID-19 and the DPC Leagues of the coming year are still up in the air.

With 650,000 in prizing and all the best Western teams invited, it is bound to make a splash during the months where The International would typically take place. A precursor to the DPC Leagues coming in 2020-2021, the Omega League has two separate leagues: an immortal tier 1 league with 12 teams (10 of which are directly invited) and a secondary league called Divine with a 50,000 prize-pool.

A Shift in Team/Tournament Business Dynamic

As noted in the title, Omega League is a Dota league that has a revenue share agreement between teams and tournaments. While the announcement text alluded to a closer collaboration between organizations to create a sustainable ecosystem. It was not outright saying what that meant nor the terms to achieve this. The revenue share includes all points of revenue for a competition including media rights, betting agreements, sponsorship, advertising and more.

For those unfamiliar, ‘revenue share’ means that if an organization generates a profit or earns monetary value, a percentage of that earning must be divided or ‘shared’ to other parties. In this case, if tournaments generate money from sponsors, selling broadcasting rights, betting cooperations or advertising for a specific event, teams earn a percentage of that earning in exchange for their exclusive participation at their event. Because team brands and their players generate audience growth for an event, that is the justification to expect a portion of the revenue generated. For example, when working with Epicenter, I was told that just having Na’Vi (and Dendi) in their event grew viewership up to a 10% increase.

The teams involved in this deal are all EU/CIS organizations including Team Secret, Team Liquid, Nigma, Alliance, Virtus.pro (part of ESforce Holding that owns Epic Esports Events), Team OG, Evil Geniuses, Na’Vi. Revenue share discussions for CN and NA organizations are still ongoing. This agreement is only for third-party online competitions. DPC-affiliated leagues, majors or tournaments are unaffected.

How It Started & Details

After WePlay!’s Mad Moon (Feb. 2020), WePlay! initiated a discussion about revenue share and closer cooperation with teams for future events and tournaments. When the COVID-19 pandemic caused Majors to be canceled for safety reasons, a surge of online event invites increased for teams. Strategically, this was an ideal time for teams to test the waters regarding revenue share agreements as they now had WePlay! opening the possibility that tournaments were willing to cooperate in regards to a revenue split. With the COVID-19 pandemic issue shifting power towards team organizations, they could now determine the scheduling for their participation on their own terms.

Unified, teams sent out proposals (RFPs) to tournament organizers: OGA Dota Pit, ESL, WePlay! and Epic Esports Events with no specified initial revenue share amount in the terms. Different conversations varied in their amount for the teams’ exclusive participation during those dates. These terms give tournaments exclusive calendar dates with no competitors and allows teams to see what kind of revenue they can generate in an esports scene that offers very little. These discussions also helped untangle the overlapping scheduling tournaments were proposing without coordinating with one another first.

ESL and WePlay! agreed but Epic Esports Events held off (before eventually joining with WePlay! to create the Omega League). For Omega League, less than 10% of revenue from sponsorships, advertising, betting and more is shared revenue.

Lastly, these agreements are on a per-event basis and may not continue once the new DPC season begins.

Strategic Goals & Outcomes

*to help understand both sides of the situation, consider reading my previous piece (June 2019)

The Omega League achieves several goals for tournament organizers. For WePlay!, they further cement their place as a leader in tournament organization for Dota 2 and other Valve-related games for future consideration of the DPC Leagues and Majors, beating out StarLadder and the Epicenter brand.

For EEE and ESforce, the Omega League keeps them desperately afloat and involved in the Dota 2 scene during a critical year for their survival (hence why they’re joining forces with WePlay!, a direct competitor and very likely successor). Both the general manager for Virtus.pro and CEO of Epicenter/EEE have departed from the organization. This year, Mail.ru Group had to write off 70% of the Holding and their initial value of 100 million has dropped to 30 million in only a couple of years. This goes without saying that the Omega League also helps RuHub who have been suffering since the Maincast/ESL/DreamHack exclusive deal. Back in January, I disclosed a rumour that Maincast paid an 8-figure amount for a multi-year deal with ESL & DreamHack. RuHub is usually the default buyer for CIS media rights to ESL/DH events (approx. 1 mil per year).

For teams, this is the first step towards a sustainable future for Dota. At the moment, teams are nearly powerless compared to the stronger influence and involvement they have with League of Legends, Counter-Strike and other games (not saying it’s perfect over there either). Teams earn about 10-20% of all prize-revenue but can pay up to 400,000+ (or more – pre-COVID) in player salaries on top of lodging, food, visas, services and more. To add, Dota players are less willing to do sponsor-related activities compared to players in other games, causing sponsors to look elsewhere for cooperative opportunities (e.g: League of Legends, streaming, etc.). This causes an uncomfortable position for teams where they cannot capitalize on the success of their Dota squad for future sponsorship. Teams earn nearly nothing from that success and depending on the level of success (or lack of) of their roster, a team can lose their entire brand power in Dota if the roster dissolves or moves on. This is not to paint team organizations as victims, but rather to continue outlining my conclusion I wrote about the Dota 2 esports scene back in June, 2019 from my article “Dota 2 Majors are not guaranteed profitable events“.

It is only natural that teams seek new revenue streams if they are finding dwindling opportunity with players and sponsors. Borrowing ideas from joint leagues in CS:GO with the ESL ‘Louvre Agreement’ may be an exploratory avenue that could lead to be more equitable ecosystem for Dota 2 outside or even potentially within the DPC system (pending Valve’s decision-making). It is very clear that the intent of Omega League is a case-study to display how the Dota 2 esports ecosystem could work to the benefit for the businesses that put the most risk and involvement into the scene.

Teams understand that tournament organizers earn little to nothing (e.g WePlay! losing money on each of their events) but teams also face the conundrum that without LANs, there is no value in Dota for (western) sponsors. This emphasizes the importance of results and to ignore other obligations that would help a team business grow an audience, consistently create engagement and engagement for current and future sponsorship opportunities.

Especially true when the Dota audience is shifting to China, SEA and Europe/CIS – markets that are secondary to sponsors. These factors lead to high operating costs with revenue and sponsorships very heavily emphasized on performance: both for players and team organizations.

Conclusion & Thoughts

This article purely aims to inform audiences about the current business inner-workings within the Dota 2 scene. If Valve draws decisions based on what fans and players call for, then the only solution to a better Dota scene is to inform that public of the struggles, growth, success and challenges esports faces.

The Omega League is a step for teams to generate revenue for a game that faces a systemic challenge of finding a reliable ecosystem. It is also a demonstration of trying for consistency in quality, production, story-telling and business collaboration. If you compare Dota to the games that teams are moving towards: PUBG Mobile, League of Legends and Rocket League, you see a consistency of exposure, potential and results (whether lost or not).

As the DPC system changes every year:

• limiting opportunity for event organizers due to less open calendar dates for third-party tournaments
• limiting the amount of involved tournament organizers (from 11 majors/minors to 9 to 3 majors and 6 seasonal leagues) driving event organizers to other games
• and continuing to emphasize performance-only value without much room for additional exposure for teams

it is becoming increasingly difficult for tournaments and teams to find stability and profit, especially if sponsorship value is lowering with each year (as noted in my 2019 article: “Dota 2 Majors are not guaranteed profitable events“).

To repeat, this is a systemic problem with the Dota esports scene. Omega League and revenue share is not about the money but a search for stability in a scene that disregards businesses.

This is a continuation of 2018’s article, “5 years, 350 million“, “4 years, 275 million“, 2017’s “3 years, 170 million“, 2015’s “2 years, 100 million” and 2014’s article: “1 Year, 40 million: Dota Builds Project Overview”.

I am celebrating 7 years of updating the Hero Builds. In December 2018, I took a haitus. In February 2019, I announced the end of the Hero Builds Project and 1 month later, I was sponsored by Rivalry.com to revive the project.

If I wrote in 2016 to 2017 that those were the most prominent years for the project and myself, I would say that 2017 to 2018 was considered the most difficult and enduring for me and the project.

5 Years, 350 Million (2018): Dota Builds Project Year in Review

For 2019-2020, I would say that my shift in focus and desire to update the builds without having to take too much interest in public opinion has increased my dedication to Dota 2 and Hero Builds. Thanks to my sponsor, Rivalry.com, my motivation for the Hero Builds Project continues. The sponsor confirms there is an inherent value in the dedicated and consistent work, regardless of waning feedback or vocal support.

Within this review, I will provide statistics detailing the impact the project has had in public matches, growth or decline in subscription growth and more. In addition, future plans, thoughts and desires will be mentioned for consideration.

350 Million to 400 Million Subscriptions – A Year of Statistic

Despite the article being released in 2020, I maintain subscriptions statistics on an annual basis (previously bi-weekly). The main reason for this lower rate of stats tracking was that the interest about these statistics is very little nowadays and the growth has been relatively consistent for the past years.

From what we were able to simulate, approximately 82.96% of all daily matches use one or more of my guides. The percentages represented show the likelihood of 1 to 7 guides simultaneously being used during a match. There has been an increase 0.29% of daily guide usage per game. We found this very peculiar and went to verify with an independent source and fellow data scientist who verified our methodology and numbers. That said, anyone who wants to discuss our approach and analysis, we welcome additional (expert) opinions (like in 2018). Please contact me directly to further cooperate.

Between 2018 to 2019, this section’s results can be summarized as the following:

• Subscription growth has been positive with 50 million new subscriptions
  • 400 Million in total subscriptions across 161 guides
• 500 Million more games have been played using my guides
  • 1.8 billion games since 2013 (including overlap)
• The Phantom Assassin guide leads with 5 million unique subscribers
  • The highest on the entire Steam platform
• Average # of subscriptions for the project reaches 2.5 million

I am still very happy that there is continued growth and satisfaction with the hero builds. With the New Player Experience coming, I am hoping that future users will continue to seek out my builds.

Sponsorship

Today, I am happy to announce my continued partnership with Rivalry.com. Their continued support has been generous and their expectations have been so few (I am not even obligated to mention them in any social media posts or blog posts). As Dota leans more towards Eastern audiences and sponsors seek Western impressions, it is relieving to see Rivalry continue to support me and other brands, people and teams in this space.

Future

Last year, I tried my hand at doing a coaching show with some friends who were generous enough to give their time to guest-appear. In addition, I’ve started writing some professional insights into the esports industry. Both were great in exploring some opinions I always wanted to say. Though I do enjoy working with on-camera talent, I am not so sure it is the right calling for me.

In addition, last year I enjoyed my time working on the StarLadder Minor, Berlin Major and PUBG Europe League. Similar to my professional work two years ago, the insight, experience and knowledge I’ve gained in esports has been tremendous.

This year, I would like to say and do more. I’m seeking to better display my qualities and explore what I can and cannot aptly do. The importance of always wanting to do more helps against questions of self-doubt. A few ideas have been circling in my head ranging from on-site event interviews to more Dota coaching but I am unsure if they are worth pursuing further. That said, both stem from my desire to learn and be able to do more with Dota 2. For now, I continue to test and research hero builds on my Twitch channel. As always, my methodology to update the hero builds has been a mix between watching and researching commonly-played item/skill builds to personally testing them and seeking feedback on improvements.

Finally, last year I wrote some suggestions for the upcoming New Player Experience for Dota 2. For the Hero Builds System, I continue to advocate the same things I have for the past 5 years: “[…] improve guide selection for new users so the first one at the top isn’t picked just because it has the highest subscription count and games played (these indicators are mostly due to those guides being around the longest).”

Conclusion

You’ve made this relatively ordinary person achieve something pretty extraordinary.

February 2019

I think I’ve talked about why I started making hero builds many times and the skinny of it was a mix of things: my self-validation through being useful for others, a tribute to the old Play-Dota guides I used in the early 2000s and most importantly: being pro-active with my frustration that people didn’t know how to play or build their heroes (including myself).

The project achieved some, if not, all these goals and there’s really nothing more I can be thankful for than that.

Yes. But it is of regional value and to get into mobile as a team brand or tournament organization would depend more on if it aligns with your brand or not. For tournament organizers, the desire to move towards mobile and the SEA/China market means further income sources through production work for publishers. For teams, it would widen your audience reach but may not align with your core target fanbase or sponsors’ interest as mobile games esports’ popularity has not hit North America (yet).

That said, as publishers make moves to bring their PC-centric games to the mobile market such as Riot Games’ Teamfight Tactics, Epic Games’ Fortnite, Valve’s Dota Underlords, Activision’s Call of Duty: Mobile and PUBG Mobile (published by Tencent), a two-way bridge is formed: converting North-American audiences to mobile and introducing Eastern mobile players to western franchises.

As 5G starts to roll-out across the United States and Europe, mobile gaming will be more embraced. For this piece, we will skim over the landscape of mobile esports as well as making note of worthy titles and scenes to consider and how they compare to other competitive titles.

*if you’re interested in following the mobile scene, consider Jeff Chau’s twitter for interesting insight as well as his valuable medium post

The Mobile Viewership Landscape

As of right now, the largest mobile esports regions are South-East Asia, China, South Korea. We say South East Asia as depending on the game, different countries pop up ranging from Vietnam, Indonesia, India and more. Additionally, LATAM also shows an immense popularity for the genre as we saw Free Fire World Series in Rio garner 2+ million peak viewers and over 7.5 million hours watched. Regarding which games are popular, Battle Royales and MOBAs have the longest staying power. Games like Free Fire, PUBG Mobile, Mobile Legends and Arena of Valor have millions in players that trickle down to an esports audience in the hundreds of thousands to millions.

While these numbers are incredible (and they really are), be wary that this is the start of esports interest on Western streaming platforms. Going back to October will highlight that viewership and interest in mobile games from a creators’ standpoint has much more realistic numbers. Similarly, if we check out Mobile Legends Esports VODs statistics on YouTube, this viewership is also much lower (where YouTube is watched mostly in the West). The popularity of these mobile games has definitely triggered interest in Eastern streaming platforms, content-creators and viewership but it has not moved towards Western European and North-American platforms nor content-creators on Twitch/YouTube (yet). The lack of viewership outside of esports events may highlight that the playerbase has not translated to valuable viewership (yet) akin to WarGaming’s massive popular World of Tanks not translating to a popular esports scene beyond Eastern-Europe brands and viewers.

or some of these events include item drops with viewership. This heightens the numbers of viewers but leads to botting and an unengaged audience (“set-and-forget”).

Its Esports Presence

The excitement about mobile esports is due to the immediate involvement of Eastern game publishers for their mobile gaming competitions. Tencent already dipping their toes with recent work into PUBG Mobile and now announcing a 5 Million prize-pool for 2020. However, when it comes to tournament org. involvement, it can be a mixed bag as there are proposals circulating from Tencent to certain tournament organizations seeking co-investment where Tencent aims to reduce their own spending in exchange for a co-invested partner from tournament organizations (who typically are looking for contractual work with publishers, not to increase their annual costs).

To add, prize-pool on games is varied. For the Mobile Legends: Bang Bang, it boasted a prize-pool of only $250,000. The Free Fire World Series: $400,000. Compared to Western esports, the prize-pools pale in comparison. Teams, as well, mostly feature organizations not involved in mainstream esports titles we see in the West. In the past, Arena of Valor featured squads from Team Vitality, SK Gaming, Alliance, Team Liquid, Immortals and more. For Free Fire, there are no notable major teams actively playing as you can see here.

That said, as we saw with PUBG Mobile, new money is being injected with every new iteration of esports. Honor of Kings’ 2019 Champions Cup featured 4.5Million dollar prize-pool for their month-long league (crowd-funded from 2million to 4.5).

Conclusion

To summarize some concerns, Mobile Esports:

• can garner a lot of attendance, especially if attendance to the event is free (Free Fire World Cup 2019 (not World Series in Rio))
• can garner a lot of viewership, especially if there are free item drops for watching – leading to potentially inactive viewers/lower engagement (Free Fire World Series Rio)
• does not garner a lot of viewership on Western platforms outside of these esports events
• receives strong game developer support and prize-pool injection
• has game developer support but they also seek co-investment from tournament brand.

There is a common misconception that player-base = possible esports reach or value for brands but the reality is that esports is always a trickle of viewership interest depending on the competitive perception of its audience. How serious are players taking their mobile games if it’s on mobile and these users are always in a setting not ideal for competitive focus (playing while riding the train, between classes at school, during lunch at work, etc.). There is more to the sociocultural consideration regarding if a popular multiplayer game equates to the esports-focused label.

Secondly, publisher involvement does not always mean endorsement as they also seek investment from tournament organizers who have yet to fully dive into the mobile market (ESL, Vodafone, StarLadder have dipped their toes with work in contract with PUBG Mobile).

Thirdly, Eastern-Asia/SEA growth does not translate into western popularity, different cultures emphasize different gaming platforms and thus different focus and directions.

Despite my skepticism, I do believe this is the start of the mobile esports scene for both Asia and Western markets. My intro regarding the coming of 5G, the growing audience (new generations) of gamers growing up with games on phones and how traditional PC-centric games like Fortnite, League of Legends and Call of Duty can bridge users from moving from their PC to the mobile but also skew their view of competition of their favourite games regardless of the platform.

That said, there are some people in the scene who are trying to sell mobile esports as an underrated opportunity. I firmly believe they are relying on FOMO (fear of missing out) to get brands to invest instead of determining if mobile esports is a sound, long-term investment.

After three years working in the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] region, namely Russia and Ukraine, with some of the leading esports organizations such as StarLadder and ESforce Holding (Na’Vi, Virtus.pro, Cybersport and Epicenter), I have grown to better understand what makes this region so competitively viable in the international esports business sector but also the disadvantages they face both as a region and as competitors. Within this article, I will outline CIS advantages but also underline their weaknesses that may reflect what the industry, itself, is also challenged with. In summary, the CIS (mainly Russia and Ukraine) are a skillful region with low cost of operations and an abundance of talent. That said, their challenges range from growing beyond their CIS-audience based ROI and the difficulty in reaching international sponsorship budgets, to undercutting competitors in prices, due to the point of potential extinction.

The CIS Ever-changing Approach

As esports moves from a regionally-split ecosystem to a service-for-marketing business for game titles and developers, the CIS region remains a competitive service production brand (especially for tournament orgs). From the PUBG Europe League, BLAST Pro Series: Moscow to the Boston and Kiev Dota 2 Major (white-label). CIS continues to make moves within the international market to act as a production service for a very cheap cost. That cheap cost, especially in an industry that struggles to break even is something only the CIS region can offer. That advantage means that CIS events cost 20 to 30% less to produce compared to Western European events. To add, sponsorship rates are sold at traditional rates, leading to low costs but strong sponsorship revenue. This is why CIS companies are looking to go international as opposed to looking inward, within their own countries, to expand their positioning and opportunities.

The CIS Challenge

The biggest hurdle the CIS region is facing is reaching international marketing/sponsorship budgets where their ROI is not just with CIS audiences but internationally. Within esports, there is no doubt that Russia and Ukraine are among the largest player-base and viewers for some esports titles. For Dota 2, almost 20% of all daily matches are played on Russian servers. The International 2019 saw a peak viewership of 670,000 Russian views.

For hosting events in Russia or Ukraine, physical turn-out for these events require a lot more effort and cost to achieve than in some more internationally-viable countries like Germany that are in proximity of other European Union countries. The reasons for these additional CIS efforts include:

• Flying professional players and teams to Russia or Ukraine has a lot of bureaucratic visa hoops to go through than in European countries
• For most events (not just esports), fans not native to the Russian or Ukranian hosted city, do not internally travel to that city. So when an event is hosted in Moscow, its audience reach is mainly Moscow-living residents.
• In advertising and sponsorship, the CIS region is considered a tier 3 market behind the US (North America) and Europe (Germany, Spain, Italy, UK and France)

When ESforce acquired Virtus.pro, Na’Vi, Cybersport.ru, Epic Esports Events (Epicenter) and RuHub Studios, it looked to create an internal ecosystem that:

• Signals the international impact of CIS brands
• Represents CIS on the international stage to improve perception of CIS businesses
• Creates enough collective reach and marketing value for international sponsors
• Is self-sustaining and self-dependent

While some of those goals were achieved, not all appeared to be ambitiously possible. The truth is that ESforce is an attempt for self-sustaining profitability within the CIS region and with endeavours internationally. From YOTA Arena, a LAN Cafe and esports physical space for local to regional tournaments, to Fragstore Holding, a merchandise company seeking to bring international team merchandise to the CIS marketplace, ESforce explored many (failed) avenues of monetization to capture the CIS market under one umbrella. As many newcoming organizations are seeking physical spaces for their esports endeavours, they’d be wise to look into those who have already trailed this space and failed.

White-Label Services and Undercutting

As written in my previous works: “Publishers are dictating what esports will be” (October, 2019), publishers are dictating the direction of their competitive titles. With it comes the transformation of CIS tournament orgs. providing production services for these games, sometimes even for other esports organizations like PGL (Boston & Kiev Major, 2016-2017), Winstrike (Blast Pro Series: Moscow) and more, acting as a white-label – meaning without their brand attached. The recent Berlin Major, though performing weaker in comparison to previous majors, highlights StarLadder’s continued reach to go international along with their production services to companies.

In terms of event development in Russia and Ukraine, it is internally rumoured that CIS companies are now paying for events to be in Russia such as Winstrike paying Blast Pro Series $600,000 sum to deliver their branded event in Moscow (with white-label production from StarLadder). In exchange for that fee, Winstrike can sell local sponsorshp rights and keep the ticket revenue (which is still a net loss) and Blast keeps all international sponsorship revenue plus a nice country fee they’ve never received before!

If the rumours are true, new-coming CIS brands purchasing tournaments may signal poor health for the region. Or worse, that buying opportunity may become the norm for Eastern European businesses. To add, if more brands turn to being event production service companies for international businesses, companies will continue to undercut each other to the point of providing services for free or at a low cost that could never be recuperated (e.g: WePlay and the Late Game show for CIS).

Conclusion

While Russian/Ukrainian businesses continue to prosper and receive new investment, it is unfortunate that the CIS region as a whole does not have much going within but a lot to offer for the outside. As westerners, we tend to either dismiss, overlook or underrate the value the CIS region has to provide. At the same time, these businesses also face many hurdles as they transition towards the international stage. With American brands dominating stronger esports markets like North America while also moving towards the European and Chinese regions, it will be very important for CIS countries to make their place as the esports scene solidifies. In addition, they must adapt their work culture practices to attract international leadership and staff if they are to connect with businesses outside their region. This is also true for CIS teams for attracting international audiences. CIS teams create content for their CIS fan-base but also must find ways to attract and connect to their international (minority) audience despite the language and cultural differences.

Having worked in many CIS esports business, I’ve found to be among a mix of smart leaders and big spenders. I am often caught by surprise of the work culture in the CIS region where employees sacrifice 14 hours a day, 6 days a week, for salaries that equate to $12.50 an hour. That said, some of the best events and crowds I’ve ever seen were in Russia and Ukraine. I continue to believe that Russia and Ukraine are viable markets for future investment but also feel that going international is not only something these CIS companies must immediately focus on but that all of esports is aiming for the past few years now.

But they can all be competitive entertainment. The rise of esports has lead to a variety of game developers pushing their community and marketing outreach into esports competition when it may not be suited or appealing to their large and wide-ranging playerbase. This piece is not to determine which games should or should not be esports-focused, as we’ve even seen games built specifically for esports fail. This discussion is to highlight brands that re-examine esports as other than the height of competition or an emblem to traditional sports spectating and treat it more as the marketable and exciting entertainment that esports runs parallel to general gaming consumption culture.

With the upcoming genre of AutoChess games where randomization heavily affects a player’s chances of winning a match, it is relieving to see Riot Games’ potential approach to their version of AutoChess as a spectator “esport”:

Teamfight Tactics will feature in its own tournament at this year’s League of Legends All-Star event. However, a full-on competitive league isn’t likely for the title. “We’re going to focus a lot more on entertainment-focused infrastructure, that won’t be as regimented,” said Needham. “That’s just specific to how the game is played. It’s a bit more casual than League of Legends from a competitive perspective.”

John Needham, Global Head of Esports at Riot Games (The Esports Observer, 2019)

When it comes to treating a game as an esport, publishers and most tournament organizers seem to define esports as a serious and competitive tournament in front of millions of viewers and a stadium full of exciting attendants. For games that align with the players’ perception of skill and strategy, this is a fairly normal expectation. For genres where randomized elements heavily affect the game it can feel disjointed for fans to see a game, such as Hearthstone, take such a serious tone when it is typically played at leisure and without much focus or thought. It may appear as if I am talking negatively or downward about these games, but in reality, I am simply prefacing the idea that different levels of competition and competitive titles should be approached differently as esports entertainment. The attention, focus and energy I give to playing games like Counter-Strike: Global Offensive, Poker or Dota 2 is significantly different than how I play Team Fortress 2, Artifact or Dota Underlords. Similarly with television, how I digest a sitcom may differ from how I focus in a serious drama – both are appealing but I treat them differently.

Not all games have to be esports but it’s not flawed to try different formats for a competitive title to see which resonates best with its variety of audiences. It goes without saying that even though the live-streamer, Kripparian, thinks people don’t take competitive Hearthstone seriously, he is mostly referring to his cultural and regional audience which may view Hearthstone less seriously than in the Asian regions (China, SEA, etc.).

Tone and Environment

In terms of tone and environment, two major studios have set the standard for a serious tournament set in a relaxed and fun setting for the viewers: HomeStory Cup and Beyond The Summit. Though the matches and competition are of the highest level, both HomeStory Cup and Beyond the Summit [BTS] have integrated an environment that spotlights casters and player personality, knowledge, jokes and memorable moments for the viewer.

HomeStory Cup & Beyond the Summit

Both HomeStory Cup & Beyond the Summit have the same premise: stuff a bunch of pro-players into a house (now enlarged studio), remove the live audience and let them hang out. It’s evidently more complicated than that but the elements of games being casted by sometimes 3 to 4 people, with pros jumping in and out on the mic at their own desire, leads the commentating changing from a partnership between colour-commentator and analyst to a casual conversation between highly-admired and respected individuals. It is a treat for both the talents involved as well as a unique experience for fans who want to feel a part of the event and don’t typically get to hear professional players talk, give insight and hang out.

To further this tone, Beyond the Summit’s creative team put together fantastic sketches and satirical pieces often involving pro-players and of which resemble popular skits or videos that audiences would recognize such as the YouTube video: “Rediculous B-ball shots!!!!!!!”

What’s also key to note is that this relaxed format can be applied to almost any game, allowing Beyond the Summit or HomeStory Cup to expand to games they typically couldn’t break into (as easily). For HomeStory Cup, they have replicated their setup for StarCraft II and Hearthstone whereas Beyond the Summit has achieved events for Dota 2, Counter-Strike, Super Smash Bros., Mortal Kombat, Rocket League, Team Fortress 2 and more.

Though I didn’t give them a paragraph, DreamLeague has also taken an otherwise serious game and league and converted their production into a very relaxed and casual setup. Their talent, a mixed group of both intelligent and personable people, tease and josh with one another in-between highly-competitive games. The mix provides fans with comic relief among highly-respected talent as well as the exciting ups-and-downs of competitive games. This mix also helps off-set the otherwise long and perceived repetitive nature of league formats.

Though if you’re not an active follower of these games or people, some of this content might look rough or immature. But these sketches are about engaging with the on-going conversations with its audience, being in on the jokes and, ultimately, having fun in an industry that sometimes takes itself more seriously than it needs to. In that admittance comes a plethora of creative ideas that resonate with an audience and distinguishes a brand from the monotony of competitive tournaments.

Formats & Modes

In terms of formats, we typically have varying degrees of tournaments or leagues involving a bracket and group-stage. Month-long leagues play group stages online with an offline bracket stage for audience attendance. However, many event organizations try or have tried unique formats, modes and broadcasts to distinguish themselves from other events, especially if it meant at a lower-cost or without additional logistical challenges.

IPL Fight Club

The format for the IPL Fight Club, a weekly show-match King-of-the-Hill series by IGN back in 2011 (to 2013) involved players being pitted against one another where the loser goes home and the winner received $500. For each win, the “King” receives an additional $100 bounty that which an adversary can claim the bounty if they win. Though show-matches are on the decline for many games, this unique format has yet to be replicated by other event organizers and really lends itself to a story-line of just how long someone can go undefeated and who will claim their bounty.

Twitch Rivals

Streamers over Competitors

Twitch and their program, Twitch Rivals, really maximize the value of their platform and range of showcased games to provide a unique experience for fans and viewers. Instead of relying on competitors to be entertaining, they provide reasons for involved Twitch streamers to be competitive in games of all competitive levels (casual to serious).

Captain’s Draft

Captain’s Draft is a unique mode in Dota 2 where a randomized and limited amount of heroes (27 out 117) are available for both teams to then ban and draft according to their play-style. For MoonDuck Studios, this was their first live event and its uniqueness played its part to set itself apart from other Minor and Major events. Captain’s Draft allowed for heroes that are typically seldom played to be played more often while also ensuring that games are varied in terms of strategy and hero cohesion as opposed to traditional tournaments that can sometimes see the same heroes picked regularly because of their strengths and benefits to the team.

Midas Mode

Fan Interaction

Going one step further than Captain’s Draft, Midas Mode by MoonDuck Studios broke new ground. Not only did Midas Mode had an economy in their matches that would affect drafts for each team participating but the event also provided a variety of features for fans to be directly involved with these competitive matches. In the video below, we can see specials being able to fight professional players as Roshan, punching away at them using a VR headset. Other participation also include being units on the board to help teams scout and fight neutral creeps. Midas Mode is the only event to have this level of involvement with fans. ESL being the second organization to have additional activities for fans at their events (none of which have anything to do with the broadcast or matches).

Value & Viewership

For the sake of upholding competition, a lot of events start to blend in with one another, exhausting fans who can grow tiresome of seeing the same teams participating in match-ups they have done just the previous week. For Counter-Strike, there are over 30+ tier 1 events (32% of the annual calendar) and over 40+ tier 2 events (Beyond the Summit’s CS events are considered tier 2 but feature tier 1 teams). Not all these events are profitable, let alone distinguished enough to garner viewership akin to the cost to host and run these offline events.

It goes without saying that not all these events achieve their ideal KPIs. However, the consideration to alter an event into something that has a lower cost-ceiling in return for a more creatively distinguished event can help a brand be set apart from the rest. For example, WePlay Studios continues to operate their brand at extreme losses, but due to the efforts to distinguish their brand with unique settings, animated and live sketches and continued efforts in exploring esports competitions for games such as Artifact and Underlords, they were granted a Minor slot for this Dota 2 season.

There is plenty of room in esports to transform titles with struggling viewership into entertaining games to watch under the right tone and environment. As Riot Games has determined, if a game has aspects that reduce the quality of competition, it may be safer to gear the competitive scene to be more reliant on personality and entertainment over the sanctity of quality competition. For Nintendo, their annual World Championships receives harsh criticism from the Super Smash community because its ruleset does not align with what the competitive scene expects. However, for Nintendo, this marketable event aims to appeal to all demographics and players who may not treat the game as competitively as the esports scene does. That sacrifice plays into Nintendo’s targeted audience and frame for the Nintendo Switch to be accessible and available for anyone to pick up and play.

The conclusion of this piece is to say that not only has esports not explored sufficiently in what ways it can be more engaging and entertaining for some or all types of audiences, but also that its identity has become too narrow to hold all the brands and companies that want to jump into this growing market. The scene is expanding vertically but its horizontal expansion is revolving around types of companies, not number of companies. The identity of esports continues to be an on-going subject I’ve talked about previously in “Publishers are dictating what esports will be”. This article can be tacked up to the marketing aspect of the scene and the games involved.